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THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CONSCIOUSNESS, LAW AND REALITY 
    Douglass Cassel*  
AUTHOR’S PREFACE 
¶ 1 Human rights have suffered sharp setbacks in the four years since the paper that 
follows was delivered in London in the summer of 2000.  The terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, and the Bush Administration’s ensuing “war on terrorism,” have 
led not only to a demotion of human rights on the list of American foreign policy priorities, but 
also to gross violations of human rights by Washington. 1 Among other recent assaults on the rule 
of law are the prolonged detentions of hundreds of prisoners without trial or due process of law 
at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2  Repressive regimes around the 
world have happily seized on American regression as precedent and pretext to trample on due 
process of law and to crack down on political dissent.3 
¶ 2 The question is whether this is merely a temporary overreaction by a conservative 
administration, echoing the pattern of past American violations of civil liberties in times of war 
and emergency, 4 or is instead the first sign of a long-term reversal of the human rights gains of 
the twentieth century. One hopes that this, too, shall pass. 
¶ 3 Because the question remains open, however, I thought it best to leave the following 
essay as it stands, in its pre-9/11 innocence.  Time will tell whether Washington and other 
governments regain their senses and come back to an appreciation of the hard-won gains for 
human rights in the twentieth century. 5  For the reasons stated in the essay, I believe there is 
reason to remain guardedly optimistic. 
I.  Introduction  
 ¶ 4 After overthrowing the elected government of Chile in 1973, General Augusto 
Pinochet set out on a rampage of torture, murder and disappearances of thousands of political 
opponents.  What if he had done so a half century sooner?   
                                                 
* Director, Center for International Human Rights, Clinical Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law.  
1 See generally Douglass Cassel, International Human Rights and the United States Response to 11 September, in 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHTS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE 251-297 
(C. Fijnaut et. al. eds., 2004).  
2 See Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, Rassul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct.  534 (2003).  
3 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR 
THE POST -SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES, ch. 5 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.  
4 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties at Risk Again: A U.S. Tradition , CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2003, at C1.  
5 See Michael Ignatieff, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002,at A25.  
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 ¶ 5 In 1923 the world had no torture treaty, no genocide convention, no Amnesty 
International, no BBC television.  Spanish courts in the 1920’s would not have indicted Pinochet 
for torturing Chileans in Chile. Britain would not have agreed to extradite him to Spain for trial, 
nor would the Law Lords have allowed it.  Protests, if any, might not have been organized until 
the General was safely aboard a steamer back to South America.    
 ¶ 6 His victims would thus have shared the fate of the Armenians slaughtered by the 
Turks in 1915.  When reminded of that genocide two decades later, on the eve of launching 
another, Hitler would scoff, "Who now remembers the Armenians?" 
 ¶ 7 Fortunately, the half-century since the fall of the Third Reich has witnessed nothing 
less than a revolution in global human rights consciousness, law and institutions.  Atrocities are 
still committed, but we now have international legal tools to address them—if we have the will. 
 ¶ 8 This paper assesses the rights revolution in historical context and asks, What drives it? 
II. The Rights Revolution in Historical Context  
A. Culture 
 ¶ 9 Human rights embody core values.  Among them are the dignity of all human beings, 
their equality of fundamental worth, and their need to live in community, with respect and 
empathy for others, but also with some measure of individual liberty.  Historically, the West has 
no monopoly on these values.6  In greater or lesser degree they have long been embraced by the 
world's major religious and philosophical traditions.7  Most cultures in most eras, however, saw 
them more as duties than as rights, emphasized community more than individuality, and enforced 
them more by authoritarian compulsion or by social ethos than by law. 
 ¶ 10 That was largely true of the West, too, until the last millennium.  But at least since 
the sealing of the Magna Carta in 1215,8 and arguably since the twelfth century in continental 
debates on canon law, 9 European civilization began to forge a distinctive path.  Western moral 
theology, secular philosophy, and law—if not practice—gradually came to stress rights more 
than duties, the individual more than the community, and the rule of law more than that of brute 
                                                 
6See generally Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Western Values, NEW REPUBLIC 33, July 14 and July 21, 1997. 
7PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 4-12 (1998) 
(hereinafter “Lauren”). 
8See generally J.C. Holt, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1992). 
9See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND 
CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 (1997); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Book Review: The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural 
Rights Tradition: The Achievement of Brian Tierney, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 437 (1998); Kenneth Pennington, Review 
Essay: The History of Rights in Modern Thought , 47 EMORY L.J. 237 (1998); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Legal History: 
“Am I, By Law, The Lord of the World?”: How the Juristic Response to Frederick Barbarossa’s Curiosity Helped 
Shape Western Constitutionalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1646 (1994) (reviewing KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE 
AND THE LAW, 1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1993)); Harold J. 
Berman, Book Review , 45 La. L. Rev. 1133 (1985) (reviewing BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650 (1982)). 
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force.  By the eighteenth century, these trends—and their cultural distinctiveness—were 
indisputable in much of Europe and North America. 
 ¶ 11 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the culture of individual rights under 
law began to spread.  It first found formal expression in the constitutions of the newly 
independent, former European colonies of Latin America.  Strands were later woven into 
movements to "modernize" such competing cultures as those of Japan, Turkey and China.   
B.   Early Treaties 
 ¶ 12 Rights culture also found footholds in particular international rules and regimes.  
Early treaties protecting group rights resulted from efforts by European governments to 
ameliorate the causes of war.  While the 1648 peace treaties of Westphalia are known mainly for 
establishing the principle of national sovereignty, they nonetheless recognized rights of free 
exercise of religion. 10  Three centuries later the lessons of World War I moved the League of 
Nations, even while rejecting a broad charter of rights, to recognize rights of ethnic minorities in 
its Charter and Minorities Treaties.11 
 ¶ 13 Nineteenth and early twentieth century treaties resulted from campaigns by religious 
and secular non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) in the West.  A broad-based abolitionist 
movement stimulated treaties outlawing slavery and the slave trade.12  The founders of the Red 
Cross helped bring about treaties to humanize the law of war.13  And the labor movement won 
treaties to protect women and child workers, as well as the establishment of the International 
Labor Organization in 1919.14 
C. The Formal Revolution 
 ¶ 14 Still, by the eve of World War II, the culture of rights and NGO advocacy of rights 
remained largely confined to the West.  The principal exceptions were independence movements 
asserting rights of self-determination and racial equality (against the West).  Legal protection of 
rights was left almost entirely to domestic law.  International law recognized only some rights, 
for some persons, in some places.  International enforcement mechanisms were even more 
limited.  
 ¶ 15 Yet only half a century later, human rights consciousness is now global.  Almost 
everywhere the language of rights is spoken by diplomatic, governing, policy and academic 
elites, activist NGO's, the press and, in many countries, sectors of growing middle classes.  
International law today formally recognizes almost all human rights, for almost all persons, in 
almost all places.   
                                                 
10STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 77-81 (1999). 
11LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 98-99. 
12 Id. at 38-45; ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST  (1998). 
13LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 58-62. 
14Id. at 53-57, 75-76, 96-97. 
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 ¶ 16 And international human rights law is now implemented by a proliferation of global 
and regional institutions and mechanisms—reporting requirements, monitoring devices, public 
hearings, special mediators, investigative bodies, complaint procedures, international courts, 
admission requirements for international organizations, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, and even occasional military intervention. 
 ¶ 17 The second half of the twentieth century, in short, witnessed global advances in 
human rights consciousness, law and institutions, so widespread and profound that they amount 
to a revolution.   
D. Realities 
 ¶ 18 The reality of rights is another matter. The last two decades have registered dramatic 
improvements in many parts of the world.  Nonetheless the 1990’s saw massive ethnic cleansing 
in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, indiscriminate shelling of civilians in Chechnya, 
unspeakable brutality in Sierra Leone, unchecked violence in Colombia and the Congo, 
continued systemic violence against women in many countries, and widespread poverty and 
growing economic inequality within and between nations.  The rights revolution has yet to 
triumph on the ground.   
E. The View from the Potomac and the Thames 
 ¶ 19 Even citadels of rights culture, with comparatively good domestic rights records, are 
not paragons of performance.  The United Kingdom has been shocked by scandals of convictions 
based on evidence falsified by police.  In the United States poor defendants are sentenced to 
death after grossly inadequate representation by incompetent and underpaid lawyers.   
 ¶ 20 With respect to international human rights law, despite their common rights 
traditions, the U.K. and U.S. are at radically different stages of development.  The U.K. is party 
in a meaningful way to human rights treaties and courts.  London yields to judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, even in controversial cases of public interest.  Britain is 
subject as well to human rights rulings by the European Court of Justice.  Although among the 
last Council of Europe members to do so, Britain recently made European human rights law 
enforceable in domestic courts. 
 ¶ 21 The U.S., on the other hand, is not yet prepared to submit to international human 
rights law.  We refuse to join widely accepted treaties on rights of women and children, on anti-
personnel land mines, on an International Criminal Court, and on economic and social rights, as 
well as our regional human rights treaty.  Although we have ratified treaties on genocide, torture, 
race discrimination, and civil and political rights, we attached debilitating reservations.15  These 
provisos conform the application of treaty norms in the U.S. to our na tional preferences.  They 
also make the treaties largely unenforceable in our domestic courts, while declining to accept 
even non-binding international complaint procedures, let alone the jurisdiction of international 
courts.   
                                                 
15See generally David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The 
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183 (1993).    
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 ¶ 22 A majority of our Supreme Court appears to disregard international norms relevant to 
interpretation of our domestic human rights,16 and joins our executive and legislative branches in 
declining to respect unanimous rulings on provisional measures by the World Court.17 
 ¶ 23 In historical context, the differences between the U.K. and U.S. should not be 
overstated.  They may reflect transitory extremes of power differentials.  The British empire at 
its height was no more willing than today’s superpower to submit to the collective preferences of 
weaker nations.  As the rising future power of Europe and Asia constrains American 
unilateralism, the advantages of international law may be more fully appreciated by Washington. 
 ¶ 24 Even now the U.K. and U.S. are united in post-Cold War foreign policies designed to 
promote human rights abroad.  Without Anglo-American insistence, there might be no 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  While critics may 
question the consistency and priority of our human rights policies, there is broad agreement on 
their direction, if not on their weight relative to other foreign policy goals. 
F.  The Challenge Ahead 
 ¶ 25 The main human rights challenge in the current century is to translate global 
consciousness, law and institutions into reality.  The legacy of the second half of the 20th century 
is that we are better positioned to meet that challenge.  We now have many of the necessary 
tools.  But our capacity to wield them will be shaped in many ways—some positive, some 
negative—by overriding forces of economic and technological globalization, more powerful than 
any nation.   
 ¶ 26 This need not make us prisoners of determinism.  The last century buried one 
ideology that pretended to reduce humanity to no more than a pawn of supposedly iron and 
objective laws of history.  Let us not resurrect another.  Neither class struggle nor globalization 
deprives us of opportunity—or responsibility—to make real the values of dignity, liberty, 
equality and mutual respect for members of the human family. 
 ¶ 27 The question is whether we have the will, the vision, the determination and the 
intelligence to put to good use the tools bequeathed us by the rights revolution.  To do so will 
often entail costs—in domestic political support, sovereignty, trade benefits, investment 
opportunities, tax revenue and, on occasion, the safety of our soldiers.  Our recent record of 
willingness to make costly commitment in the service of human rights is mixed at best. Our 
future commitment may depend less on the further evolution of international human rights law 
and institutions, than on how our democratic polities choose to answer a basic question, one first 
posed at the dawn of the Judaeo-Christian tradition: Are we our brothers' keeper?18 
                                                 
16See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Compare the majority’s opinion at 370 note 1 with Justice 
Brennan’s dissent at 382, 390 note 10. 
17Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Germany v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111 (1999). 
18Genesis 4:9; see also  LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 4, 5-6. 
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III.      Before the Revolution 
 ¶ 28 Before World War II the notion of rights, let alone human rights, was foreign to most 
of the world.  As early as 1912 elites in China could call for “equalization of human rights,”19 but 
the vast majority even of educated Chinese had no concept of what this meant.   
 ¶ 29 Even in the West, barely a handful of NGO’s identified themselves as “human rights” 
groups; few if any groups elsewhere embraced the term.  While independence movements in 
Asia and Africa organized for rights, their emphasis was specifically on rights of self-
determination and racial equality. 
 ¶ 30 Otherwise human rights consciousness before World War II was confined to a small 
intellectual elite concentrated in Europe and the Americas.  They drafted international bills of 
human rights and lobbied for their adoption, but their time had not yet come.20 
 ¶ 31 Nor did pre-war international law—subject to discrete exceptions mentioned above -- 
address human rights.  In 1905 a leading international law treatise declared that the very core of 
domestic sovereignty embraced a nation’s authority to “treat its subjects according to [its] 
discretion.”21 
 ¶ 32 The incompatibility of this doctrine with principles of humanity was exposed by Nazi 
atrocities.  As early as 1933 a Jew fired from his job complained to the League of Nations.  
Unlike most German Jews, because he happened to live in Upper Silesia, he was covered by a 
treaty.  The minority clauses of the German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia guaranteed 
equal treatment in employment without regard to race, language or religion.  Even so, Germany 
insisted before the League that the “Jewish question” fell exclusively within its domestic 
jurisdiction. 22   
 ¶ 33 As a matter of international law at the time, but for the happenstance that the victim 
resided in Upper Silesia, Germany would have been right: discrimination against its own citizens 
was its own business.   
¶ 34 Even the Final Solution, Hermann Goering would later claim at Nuremberg, “was our 
right!  We were a sovereign State and that was strictly our business.”23  He was wrong:  The 
Holocaust, whose death trains crossed national borders to reach death camps in Poland, was an 
international affair.   
¶ 35 But what if Germany had slaughtered only German Jews, and only in Germany?  
Under the positive international law of the day, Goering would have been right: how a country 
treated its own citizens within its own borders was generally a matter exclusively within its 
domestic jurisdiction.    
                                                 
19LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 82. 
20See generally Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447 (1992); LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 105-123. 
21 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 124 (1905). 
22See LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 130-135. 
23Id. at  202-203 (case of Franz Bernheim). 
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¶ 36 This pre-war rule, centuries old, was tacitly confirmed at Nuremberg.  The original 
English text of the 1945 London Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal authorized prosecutions for 
crimes against humanity “committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; 
...”24  This would have permitted trials for atrocities against Jews in Germany before 1939.  
However, the prosecutors later adopted a Protocol limiting trials of crimes against humanity to 
those committed “in execution of or in connection with” war crimes or crimes against peace.25  
The Tribunal’s judgment confirmed that although persecutions of Jews in Germany before 1939 
were “established beyond all doubt, . . . it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done 
in execution of, or in connection with” a war crime or crime against peace.26  Thus no one was 
convicted at Nuremberg for outrages against German Jews before the war. 
 ¶ 37 Relegating peacetime human rights to exclusive domestic jurisdiction reflected the 
realities of the day.  None of the prosecuting powers at Nuremberg had an interest in 
international scrutiny of its own human rights practices.  Stalin had murderous purges to conceal.  
Britain and France had colonies, where rights of self-determination and equality were trampled.   
 ¶ 38 And the US still had large pockets of legalized racial segregation.  At the Versailles 
peace conference in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson had gaveled down a proposal, supported 
by a majority of delegates, to insert a provision on racial equality in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations.  When a French lawyer objected to this usurpation, Wilson responded that there were  
“too serious objections on the part of some of us.”27      
 ¶ 39 Prior to World War II, then, human rights simply could not come under the umbrella 
of international law.  If they had, the major powers would have found themselves on the Ten 
Most Wanted list of violators.  As late as the 1930's, the world was not ready for international 
human rights law. 
IV.    The Revolution 
A.   Consciousness 
 ¶ 40 The post-war human rights revolution, first and foremost, is one of consciousness.  
Half a century after the defeat of the Nazis, human rights stories run in the media almost daily, 
almost everywhere.  Hundreds of NGO’s from all over the world regularly flock to United 
                                                 
24M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 582-584 (1992) 
(reprinting London Charter).        
25Id. at 585-86 (reprinting Protocol to Agreement and Charter, London, 6 Oct. 1945).  The Protocol replaced the 
semicolon following the phrase “before or during the war” with a comma, so that the phrase was modified by the 
later phrase “in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, . . ..”  Other 
than crimes against humanity, thus limited by the change in punctuation, the only other crimes within the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction were war crimes and crimes against peace. 
26The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 131 (1946); Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 
Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 (1947). 
27LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 100. 
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Nations human rights conferences.  Mexico alone, which fifteen years ago had only a handful of 
human rights NGO’s, now has scores.  Law school courses on human rights, commonplace in the 
U.S. and Europe, have spread throughout law faculties in Latin America and begun to reach 
Africa and Asia as well.   
 ¶ 41 Major religions, formerly alienated from or hostile to human rights, have undergone 
conversions.  Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, embraced much of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The protestant World Council of Churches has 
explicitly campaigned for international human rights since the 1970's.28  Buddhist priests are 
now persecuted by Myanmar’s military junta for advocating human rights.29  And in the largest 
Muslim nation—Indonesia—the preamble to a law establishing a Human Rights Court recites 
that “Human rights are basic rights bestowed by God on human beings . . .. ”30 
 ¶ 42 Meanwhile Amnesty International and other NGO’s publish annual assessments of  
human rights in nearly every country, along with countless special reports and daily press 
releases.  It has become virtually impossible to discuss world affairs in diplomatic circles, the 
press, parliaments, universities and, increasingly, even on the streets, without referring to their 
human rights aspects.   
 ¶ 43 Some go so far as to call human rights the new “secular religion” of the 20th 
century. 31  While that may be an exaggeration, human rights has become embedded in how 
educated citizens in most countries understand the world.  It is a primary lens through which they 
view the relations of peoples to governments, individuals to societies, and minorities to 
majorities. 
B.  International Law 
 ¶ 44 The triumph of rights consciousness has both contributed to and been stimulated by 
an explosion in international human rights law.  The rubicon was crossed in 1945.  Early drafts 
of the United Nations Charter, prepared in 1944 by the major allied powers at Dumbarton Oaks 
in Washington, hardly mentioned human rights.32  But scores of NGO’s at the U.N.’s founding 
conference at San Francisco demanded that the allies fulfill their   highly publicized wartime 
commitments to human rights.  The State Department, hoping to avoid a repetition of the Senate 
rejection of the League of Nations, invited some forty-two U.S. NGO’s to the conference as 
“consultants.”33  When these religious, labor, civil rights, peace, world affairs and professional 
                                                 
28Id. at 272. 
29U.S. DEP’T STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BURMA, at 2, available at 
http://www.state.gov.  
30Law 26/2000 Establishing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, at prmbl. § A (Indon.) (adopted by the People’s 
Representative Assembly Nov. 6, 2000).   
31John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 10 n. 26 (1996) (citing 
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 110-11 (1951)). 
32LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 166-71. 
33Id. at  182. 
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groups met with the chief U.S. government delegate, according to State Department notes, 
“Human rights was the topic of discussion.”34 
 ¶ 45 The British Foreign Office was similarly pressed.  A formal Memorandum from 
London’s Council of Christians and Jews, whose members included, among others, the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and of Westminster, the Chief Rabbi and the moderator of the 
Church of Scotland, urged that human rights be deemed essential and given prominence by the 
British delegation. 35 
 ¶ 46 The NGO’s fell short of their goal of including an international bill of human rights 
in the U.N. Charter.  But working together with Latin American and Asian nations, they 
succeeded in internationalizing human rights.  Unlike the Dumbarton Oaks draft—and far 
beyond anything in pre-war international law—the final Charter declares that the U.N.’s 
purposes include “international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion; . . . ”36  Further, “the United Nations shall promote: . . .  universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . ”37  And, “All Members pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the 
achievement” of those purposes.38 
 ¶ 47 Couched in diplomatic ambiguity, the Charter lacked juridical precision.  But the 
main hurdle was cleared: by law, human rights were now a legitimate international concern.   
 ¶ 48 There was one catch.  Governments stipulated that nothing in the Charter “shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state . . . ”39  But this defense was weak: It did not specify what matters were 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.”  And with human rights written all over the rest of 
the U.N. Charter, it was difficult any longer to contend that they were essentially domestic. 
 ¶ 49 Later developments in U.N. law and practice would consolidate this first step, 
making clear that gross violations of human rights are not within domestic sovereignty.  
Although recalcitrant nations even now yelp “national sovereignty” and “domestic jurisdiction” 
when called to international account, their legal argument is no longer credible.  No government 
believes it, except perhaps the one attempting to resurrect it as a defense.  In international law, 
human rights have won the war against exclusive domestic sovereignty.   
 ¶ 50 If the first step was to internationalize rights, the second was to develop the first, 
officially adopted international bill of rights.  This was done in two stages.  In 1948, following 
two years of work by the Human Rights Commission chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.N. 
                                                 
34Id. at 183. 
35Id. at  181-182. 
36U.N. CHARTER art. 1.  
37Id. at art. 55, para. c. 
38Id. at art. 56. 
39Id. at art. 2.7. 
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General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The final vote was 
forty-eight in favor, none opposed and eight abstentions (the Soviet bloc plus Saudi Arabia and 
South Africa).  Although not legally binding—Mrs. Roosevelt was instructed by the State 
Department to so state on behalf of the U.S.—the Declaration proclaimed “a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”  Those standards include not only a full basket of 
the familiar civil and political rights, but also a healthy bushel of economic, social and cultural 
rights.   
 ¶ 51 As Professor Mary Ann Glendon argues persuasively, the vision of the Declaration, 
reflecting diverse cultural input in its drafting, is not one of radical individualism and self-
interest, but a balance of individual rights within and duties toward the community.40  This is 
evident in its very first article: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.” 
 ¶ 52 And in its next to last: “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free 
and full development of his personality is possible.”41   
 ¶ 53 Universal acceptance by states of the full panoply of rights in the Declaration was 
reiterated—not without debate and struggle—in U.N. conferences in Teheran in 1968 and 
Vienna in 1993. The Vienna Conference, attended by one-hundred-and-seventy-one states, 
labored mightily to produce the following compromise language: 
[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.  The international community must treat human rights 
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the 
same emphasis.  While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.42  
 ¶ 54 Many governments, of course, do not really believe that all rights stand on equal and 
indivisible footing.  The Chinese have no more use for civil and political rights than do the 
Americans for economic welfare and social rights.  But the price of consensus was that each had 
to accept the other’s favored rights, if it wished to secure full recognition for its own.  For such 
states, the indivisibility of rights is a mere diplomatic fiction. 
 ¶ 55 Other states and most NGO’s, however, take seriously the interdependence and equal 
importance of basic rights.  Many recall that the economic and social collapse of the Weimar 
Republic led to the civil and political calamity of the Third Reich. 
                                                 
40MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
41Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at Art. 29(1) (1948).  
42United Nations, World Conference on Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, at 30, 
para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (1993). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 4  
 
 
 ¶ 56 This same dichotomy was faced at the next stage, when the agreed norms were 
codified in legally binding form.  Thanks to the arrival of a large bloc of newly independent 
African and Asian states, the U.N. in 1966 finally overcame a Cold War stand-off and converted 
the aspirations of the 1948 Universal Declaration into two treaties.43  One, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, now has one-hundred-and-forty-seven states parties (but 
not yet China).  The other, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
similarly has one-hundred-and-forty-five states parties (but not the U.S.).  Together with the 
Universal Declaration and the first Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant (which 
allows complaints by individuals to the Human Rights Committee), these instruments are known 
collectively as the International Bill of Human Rights.  Most rights they secure are now widely 
recognized as having attained the status of customary international law, binding even on states 
not party to the Covenants. 
 ¶ 57 The Universal Declaration and Covenants are only the core of what is now an 
extensive corpus of international human rights law, which includes scores of global and regional 
treaties and declarations.  Among the more important and widely ratified U.N. treaties are those 
on rights of children (191 states parties), women (170) and refugees (137), and those that ban 
racial discrimination (160), genocide (133) and torture (127).44  The International Labor 
Organization has adopted major treaties on the right to collective bargaining (151 states parties) 
and banning forced labor (160) and employment discrimination (154).45  The Interna tional 
Committee of the Red Cross sponsored the 1949 Geneva Conventions (189 states parties) and the 
1977 protocols on international (158) and non- international (150) armed conflict, requiring 
respect for basic human rights in wartime.46  At the regional level, treaties with relatively 
comprehensive coverage of mainly civil and political rights have been adopted in Europe, the 
Americas and Africa.  In addition to all this “hard” law, there is a growing body of formally non-
binding international instruments—such as U.N. minimum standards for prisons—widely 
followed as benchmarks. 
 ¶ 58 In short, the revolution of the second half of the 20th century has done most of the 
work of defining and codifying substantive norms.  While new norms continue to be drafted—
important work is ongoing, for example, on indigenous rights, rights of the disabled, and 
violence against women—much attention of NGO’s and states has already properly shifted to 
matters of implementation and effectiveness. 
C.  Implementation 
 ¶ 59 International human rights law is implemented on both national and international 
planes.   
                                                 
43LAUREN, supra  note 7, at 248-257. 
44For ratification numbers, see http://www.unhchr.ch (consulted Jan. 19, 2002). 
45Id.  
46UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS: MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, Status at 31 May 2001, at 20 (2001). 
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1. National  
 ¶ 60 In the long run, if international norms are to be respected, they must be implemented 
by national institutions, which are more pervasive and potentially more effective.   
 ¶ 61 National court systems ideally have adequate resources and jurisdiction, unimpeded 
by barriers of sovereignty, to cover the full national territory.  They can call on police and other 
national or local authorities with undoubted legal authority and duty to investigate cases.  And 
once they rule, they can count on police, or if necessary in rare cases the military, to enforce their 
writ and judgments.   
 ¶ 62 Where there is a culture of the rule of law, national courts also enjoy a presumption 
of support and respect by their polities and governments for their legitimacy as institutions and 
for the need to comply with their judgments, even when one disagrees with them. 
 ¶ 63 At present, these ideal conditions are approached in only a minority of nations, 
mostly in the North Atlantic community.  Until they are achieved elsewhere, we cannot count on 
effective national implementation. 
 ¶ 64 Even where met, these conditions are merely necessary, not sufficient.  Judges must 
also be aware of interna tional norms and authorized to apply them.  Judges at present fit this 
description in some countries, but not in most, including the U.S. 
 ¶ 65 Even in some hypothetical future in which all these conditions are met in most 
countries, one might advocate a supportive role for international institutions analogous to that of 
the U.S. Supreme Court: to provide jurisprudential guidance for national courts, to resolve 
conflicting interpretations and to correct important deviations. That happy future, however, is 
nowhere in sight.  In the meantime, vigorous international institutions, working in tandem with 
incipient national mechanisms, are needed if international norms are to gain wider respect in 
practice. 
 ¶ 66 Fortunately, there have been positive recent developments on the national plane.  
Human rights ombudsmen and commissions, with a degree of institutional independence from 
government, spread from Spain throughout Latin America during the 1980's and 1990's.  They 
have now recently spread throughout Africa and Asia as well.  National courts in Latin America 
and Africa have begun to incorporate international human rights norms in their jurisprudence (a 
practice already commonplace in Europe).  Recent constitutions in Eastern Europe and Asia 
incorporate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Such formal penetration of 
international human rights law into national laws and institutions, sometimes encouraged by the 
World Bank and other foreign institutions, but which then gains a momentum of its own, is likely 
to continue.47 
2. International  
 ¶ 67 Still, national institutions in most countries are not yet ready to carry the load, and 
probably will need strong support from international institutions for decades to come.  
                                                 
47 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); 
Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121 (2001). 
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International institutions are both regional and global.  At present, in terms of their effectiveness, 
the world can be divided, with only slight exaggeration, in two parts: Western and Central 
Europe, and everywhere else. 
a) Regional 
 ¶ 68 Uniquely, Europe has three important regional human rights systems: the relatively 
comprehensive system of the Council of Europe, the European Union on discrete issues such as 
employment discrimination, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
whose recent focus has been on democratic elections and rights of ethnic minorities. 
 ¶ 69 Member states of the Council of Europe must join a number of treaties, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  They must also submit to the binding jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where for the first time in history 
individuals sue their governments before an international tribunal.  Litigants must first exhaust 
national remedies, which encourages national implementation without imposing undue burden, 
since national courts in the region function within a legal framework and culture of rule of law.   
 ¶ 70 Once the European Court rules, it may order "just satisfaction."  Compliance with its 
judgment is legally required and can be expected in practice in nearly all cases.  Although 
formally its rulings are limited to the case at hand, offending national laws are generally 
reformed.  In case of delay, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe keeps the 
matter on its docket, pestering the government until it complies. 
 ¶  71 In practice these formalities work remarkably well, if not perfectly, because of 
hospitable local conditions: societies and governments committed to the rule of law, with rights 
cultures, independent judiciaries, mutual resolve to submit to their regional referee and the 
economic resources to make it work, all in a broader context of regional integration.  Even so, 
the system did not spring full-blown overnight, but took decades of tending and experience to 
generate the comfort levels necessary for proud nations and governments to submit to 
Strasbourg. 
 ¶ 72 Where these preconditions are absent, the formal system does not prevail of its own 
weight.  Thus the Council of Europe has trouble curbing torture in Turkey, has yet to reform 
Russia, and has had to bar Belgrade from joining the Council. 
 ¶ 73 The dependence of formal structures on underlying realities is also apparent in the 
experience of the Inter-American Human Rights system, whose formal structure is modeled on 
the original, two-tiered system of the Council of Europe.  The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights receives and resolves individual complaints in the first instance, and may then 
take them before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for formally binding judgments.  
But the formalities struggle against rocky realities.  Caught between an unwilling superpower in 
the north, and weak or authoritarian governments in the south, the Inter-American system lacks 
Vol. 2] 
the political backing and economic resources to cope with patterns of gross violations of human 
rights left unremedied by dysfunctional national judicial systems.48    
 ¶ 74 Although the commission and court have managed to advance even in the face of 
such difficulties, they meet infrequently, commission resolutions are often disregarded, and the 
court renders few judgments.  When the Fujimori regime in Peru defied the court in several 
cases, the system got little diplomatic support from the Organization of American States and 
regained its footing only after Fujimori was ousted.49  Its future progress will depend less on the 
acuity of commissioners and judges, than on developments—forward or backward—in 
underlying hemispheric conditions. 
 ¶ 75 The far weaker regional system in Africa has even further to go before it will make a 
positive difference.  Asia is not yet ready even to create a formal regional or sub-regional system, 
much less to make it work. 
b) Global 
 ¶ 76 At the global level the U.N. has developed a wide array of human rights institutions 
and mechanisms.  But most, weighted down by the lowest common denominator of disparate 
national and regional human rights commitments, are weak and generally ineffective.  This is 
evidenced by their very proliferation: each new mechanism is proposed in the well-meaning 
hope that it might succeed where others have failed.  This hope is rarely fulfilled. 
 ¶ 77 U.N. mechanisms fall into four general categories.  Some are overtly political, like 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, whose fifty-three members are instructed by their 
governments.  The Commission adopts resolutions publicly criticizing countries.  It may also 
assign special rapporteurs to visit a country and publish annual reports on its human rights 
performance, in hopes of stimulating improvement.  Targeted countries rarely bow to such 
irritants.  Powerful violators—China or Saudi Arabia, for example—are in any event immune 
from U.N. political scolding. 
 ¶ 78 Other mechanisms are quasi-judicial.  Six major U.N. human rights treaties—the two 
major Covenants plus the treaties on women's and children's rights and on torture and race 
discrimination—have monitoring committees of independent experts who receive and comment 
on public compliance reports by governments.  Several also administer optional individual 
complaint procedures, which states may choose to accept.  Complaint procedures, however, are 
typically protracted, conducted behind closed doors, lack investigative resources, and culminate 
in the committee’s non-binding "observations."  The worst violators decline to accept the 
procedures at all, and many who do participate decline in the end to comply.  While these 
procedures have made a difference in individual cases—even saving the lives of death row 
inmates—their overall impact is marginal. 
                                                 
48See generally Thomas Buergenthal & Douglass Cassel, The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in 
EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 539 (Juan Mendez & 
Francisco Cox eds., 1998) 
49Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American Human Rights System Meet the 
Challenge?, 20 HUM. RTS. L. J. 167 (1999); Cassel, supra  note 47, at 128, n.24. 
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 ¶ 79 A third category involves diplomatic or bureaucratic activities by U.N. officials, 
ranging from public pronouncements and high- level visits by the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, currently former Irish President Mary Robinson, to workshops by low-level 
functionaries.  They provide a useful infrastructure, but rarely achieve significant 
breakthrough’s. 
 ¶ 80 Fourth and final are human rights interventions by the Security Council.  The 
Council’s occasional successes in military interventions are tempered by more frequent failures.  
While the interventions in Haiti and East Timor succeeded in their initial goals, the botched 
efforts in Srbrenica, Rwanda, Congo and Sierra Leone illustrate the perils of peacekeeping 
missions that offer too little, too late. 
 ¶ 81 The Council has also created ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and fostered mixed tribunals of national and international judges in 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone and in U.N. transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor.  
These tribunals, however, stand out as partial exceptions to the U.N.’s inability to bring to justice 
the likes of Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein.  The general rule has been impunity for war criminals.  
 ¶ 82 Even where tribunals exist, their success depends on uncertain political will by U.N. 
member states, especially major powers, to arrest those they indict.  The Yugoslavia tribunal did 
eventually get hold of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.  Still, its record remains 
marred by the failure to date of NATO or U.N. forces to arrest other “big fish”—notably former 
Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.  
¶ 83 On balance, though, the record of these tribunals provides an encouraging 
demonstration of the feasibility of international criminal justice.  The top former leaders of the 
genocidal regime in Rwanda are now in custody of the international tribunal.  In Yugoslavia 
some fifty indictees—more than half of the publicly known total, including some generals—have 
been captured.  Time seems to be on the side of justice.   
 ¶ 84 Moreover, with its treaty now ratified by forty-eight of the sixty required nations (as 
of mid-January 2002), the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) to try genocide, serious 
war crimes and crimes against humanity will likely to come into being in 2002.  Although its 
design was weakened by compromises made to secure support by states, the ICC deserves a 
chance, and is in any event an important if flawed first step toward permanent international 
criminal institutions.50 
D. Effectiveness 
 ¶ 85 Outside Europe, then, the landscape of international implementation appears to be 
littered with weak and mostly ineffective institutions. 
                                                 
50See generally Douglass Cassel, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A Flawed But Essential 
First Step, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF’S. 41 (1999). 
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 ¶ 86 Yet to so conclude would be unduly gloomy and misleading.  One must take account  
of historical perspective.  A few decades ago there were virtually no international human rights 
institutions.  Even a decade ago, at the close of the Cold War, there were no international 
criminal courts, no High Commissioner and few national ombudsmen.  International protection 
of human rights is still in its gangly adolescence and sprouting up rapidly.  It is far too early to 
pass judgment on its musculature at maturity. 
 ¶ 87 Even today, the seemingly weak array of international institutions is more 
meaningful than might appear.  The whole turns out to be more than the sum of the parts.  One 
reason is that the various mechanisms are rarely used singly, but are deployed in combination, 
not only with other international institutions but also with pressure from NGO's, the press and 
public opinion.  Violators are put in the spotlight.  In a world most of whose governments are 
now elected by voters,51 and where human rights consciousness is widespread, this public 
visibility, in turn, brings a degree of pressure from other governments, parliaments and 
intergovernmental bodies.  All this, in turn, may lend leverage and legitimacy to a regime's 
domestic political opponents and civil society critics.  Even if human rights enforcement usually 
has no elephant gun, it often wields a shotgun. 
 ¶ 88 This phenomenon has spread even to the courts: witness civil suits against foreign 
torturers in the U.S., the extradition case against General Pinochet in London, criminal cases 
against Latin American human rights violators in Italy and Spain, and Belgium’s exercise of 
universal jurisdiction against alleged foreign war criminals.52  This form of external pressure 
already affects the travel plans of current and former dictators around the world; in the next 
generation it may affect their behavior as well. 
 ¶ 89 The formal array of international institutions is also sometimes backed up by 
powerful external economic leverage.  In the post-Cold War era the U.S. on occasion used trade 
leverage to support human rights.  A key factor in blocking the failed attempt by Guatemalan 
President Serrano to overthrow his country's constitutional order in 1993 may have been 
President Clinton's public threat to revoke trade preferences.  Following the threat, Guatemalan 
business leaders reportedly pressed the army to side against the coup. 
 ¶ 90 In recent years the World Bank and other international financial institutions have 
sometimes intervened at key moments, citing if not "human rights," then "transparency" or other 
conceptual cousins as justifications to suspend flows of funds.  I happened to be in Santiago in 
2000 when a Chilean court ruled that General Pinochet's immunity did not shield him from 
prosecution for disappearances.  When I asked a Chilean lawyer about the risk of a military coup  
in response, his answer was, "They don't dare.  We couldn't afford the repercussions from the 
World Bank."  Whether or not this remark was true, the mere perception that international 
financial institutions might react, by itself, concentrates the minds of power elites. 
                                                 
51See Freedom House, Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20 th Century (1999), at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org) (119 democracies as of the year 2000). 
52Belgium’s use of universal jurisdiction against a Congolese official is currently under challenge before the World 
Court.  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002). 
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 ¶ 91 It also illustrates one of the most important and least appreciated factors in human 
rights enforcement: the role of uncertainty.  Governments often fight energetically to oppose the 
slightest slap on the wrist for human rights violations.  Their efforts are out of all proportion to 
any visible consequences at stake, as, for example, when the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
considers whether to upgrade its "special expert" assigned to a country to a "special rapporteur."  
What drives such resistance cannot be any immediate cost-benefit calculus, but is more likely an 
investment in risk management.  Just as individuals try to maintain reputations and credit ratings, 
because one never knows when one might need a friend or a loan, so too with countries.  Having 
a human rights rap across the knuckles may not smart today, but governments cannot be sure that 
such seeming trifles may not come back to sting them at some unknown future moment. 
 ¶ 92 The uncertainty is compounded by the long memory, ubiquitous presence and vocal 
insistence of human rights NGO's.  A regime can no longer count on today's foibles being 
forgotten tomorrow.  General Pinochet, for example, did not expect the sins of his middle age to 
cost him so dearly in his dotage.  And the reports and web pages of Amnesty International and 
other NGO's, conveniently indexed by country, lie there in perpetual ambush of unsuspecting 
governments.  Better simply to avoid getting on the list in the first instance. 
 ¶ 93 The risk to governments is further compounded by the constantly changing rules of 
the game.  Standards are constantly ratcheted up, and ingenious new traps and penalties devised.  
The only certainty may be that whatever the costs to a government of human rights violations 
today, they may be higher tomorrow.  Human rights enforcement is not so much a moving target 
as a moving marksman. 
 ¶ 94 Another underrated factor is human rights socialization of diplomats and officials of 
the offending and other governments.  Often educated abroad and regularly interacting in 
international settings, diplomats are especially susceptible to the cultural pull of human rights.  
Like other cosmopolitan elites, they find it discomfiting, if not distasteful, to defend or be seen to 
defend torture.  They would prefer not to deviate from the social norms of the Embassy circuit.  
The foreign ministry often proves to be something of a human rights advocate within 
government.  While internal security ministers may return to the company of their colonels, 
foreign ministers must face their peers in Geneva. 
 ¶ 95 All these factors combine to elevate the international costs of gross violations of 
human rights and to create incentives to conform to international norms, and thus to lend bite to 
otherwise toothless international agencies.   
¶ 96 But only up to a point.  International human rights institutions and incentives are 
overcome in a range of circumstances—when governments perceive important interests at stake, 
when their leaders are zealous or believe their political fortunes on the line, or when a country's 
economic, military or diplomatic power shields it from international sanction.  No fear of special 
rapporteurs, diplomatic embarrassment or international repercussions could dissuade the Chinese 
from reclaiming Tien An Men, the Russians from reclaiming Chechnya, or the Junta from 
retaining Myanmar in a stranglehold.  If international human rights institutions are indeed more 
than meets the eye, that is no cause for complacency. 
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E.  Reality 
 ¶ 97 The failures of the rights revolution on the ground are well known and sobering.  
That genocide could be allowed to ravage Rwanda in our time speaks volumes.  But one must 
not lose sight of the good news.  Recent decades have seen dramatic improvement in human 
rights in most of Latin America, much of central and eastern Europe, South Africa, South Korea 
and much of southeast Asia. 
 ¶ 98 In terms of economic and social rights, the picture is similar. In the last two decades 
life expectancy in the developing world rose from fifty-five to sixty-five years.  Adult literacy 
increased from forty-eight percent to seventy-two percent.  Infant mortality declined from one-
hundred-and-ten to sixty-four per one-thousand live births.  Access of rural populations to safe 
drinking water increased from thirteen percent to seventy-one percent.53   
 ¶ 99 Yet more than a billion people in developing countries still lack access to safe 
drinking water, and well over two billion to adequate sanitation.  One in five people worldwide 
live on less than a dollar a day. 54  There has also been a “sharp rise in inequality” of income 
among households in the last decade.  Inequality has also increased between countries; in the 
1990’s, average annual income per person fell in some fifty countries.55 
 ¶ 100 The lesson is a double one: progress is possible and has in fact been achieved for 
hundreds of millions, but the rights revolution still has far to go before its values of dignity, 
security, equality and liberty are realized for most people. 
V.    Driving Forces 
 ¶ 101 What drives the revolution?  Why did international human rights consciousness, 
laws and institutions—if not actual respect for rights—develop so swiftly in the last half century? 
 ¶ 102 At the outset, let us dispel a possible misconception.  Despite our historical claims 
to copyright on the concept of rights, and our comparatively good domestic records, the 
revolution is by no means an Anglo-American state enterprise.  If left to the good graces of 
Washington and London, the revolution would be delayed at the least.  Our governments 
proposed a U.N. Charter that scarcely mentioned human rights.  They led others in downgrading 
the Universal Declaration from a treaty to a mere statement of aspiration.   
 ¶ 103 Since then, as noted earlier, British and American paths diverged.  Whereas London 
joined the European Convention, the Eisenhower administration promised Senator Bricker not to 
ratify any human rights treaties.  Washington kept the U.N. human rights covenants in the deep 
freeze for the first two decades of the Cold War.   
 ¶ 104 During the Cold War US foreign policy on human rights was almost single-
mindedly selective.  While pouncing on Soviet-bloc violations, we acquiesced (or worse) in 
                                                 
53Human Development Report, U.N. Development Programme, at 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.stone.undp.org/hdr/reports/global/2000/en/.  
54Id. 
55Id. at 6. 
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atrocities by anti-communist regimes ranging from Chile and Guatemala to Zaire and Indonesia.  
Eventually Jimmy Carter pressured right-wing Latin American governments to ratify human 
rights treaties, but offered his own Senate escape clauses in the form of reservations, and even 
then could not secure U.S. ratifications.    
 ¶ 105 Since the Cold War the U.S. has more consistently advocated human rights abroad.  
Along with the U.K., we have been leading advocates of international criminal courts for 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq, Cambodia and Sierra Leone.  But we balk at a permanent 
international criminal court, because it does not offer an ironclad guarantee that no American 
soldier or official could ever be prosecuted.  Fortunately the European Union and other 
democracies are prepared to carry on without us.   
¶ 106 What, then, drives the revolution?   
A. Atrocities. 
 ¶ 107 First, it is atrocity-driven.  The graphic exposure of the Holocaust in 1945 so 
shocked public opinion, and so muted government resistance, as finally to overcome the doctrine 
of exclusive domestic jurisdiction over human rights.  Hitler proved that humanity could not 
entrust its deepest values to national governments alone. 
 ¶ 108 Subsequent outrages continue to propel the revolution.  In the 1970's U.N. human 
rights mechanisms were created largely in response to apartheid in South Africa and to General 
Pinochet in Chile.  In the 1990's international criminal courts were responses to ethnic cleansing 
in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda.  Later momentum was fueled by outrages in Kosovo, 
East Timor and Sierra Leone. 
1.  NGO's. 
 ¶ 109 Second, the revolution is NGO-driven. 56  Without constant advocacy and agitation 
by NGO's, human rights treaties would not be drafted or ratified, enforcement mechanisms not   
created or used, and violators not continually exposed.  Just as NGO's were instrumental in 
placing human rights provisions in the U.N. Charter in 1945, so they were key to mobilizing 
support among government delegations for a relatively stronger ICC in 1998.  To view 
international human rights law as an autonomous set of norms and institutions, independent of 
the role of NGO's in creating and using them, would be foolish formalism. 
B.  Decolonizing and Democratizing States. 
 ¶ 110 The revolution has also been driven by shifting coalitions of states.  From Versailles 
through the 1970's, non-western states were its most energetic advocates.  Japan pressed 
unsuccessfully to include provisions against race discrimination in the Covenant of the League of 
                                                 
56See generally  WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CURIOUS 
GRAPEVINE (1998). 
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Nations.  China pushed unsuccessfully for human rights provisions in the draft U.N. Charter at 
Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.57  But in San Francisco the following year, allied with India and the 
large bloc of Latin American states as well as NGO's, the Chinese position prevailed, resulting in 
a U.N. Charter promising human rights for all "without discrimination."   
 ¶ 111 The first human rights initiatives were brought before the U.N. General Assembly 
not by western states, but by Egypt, India and Panama, challenging racial and religious 
persecution and South African racial practices as violations of the U.N. Charter.58 
 ¶ 112 The principal UN human rights treaties were rescued from Washington and Moscow 
only by the arrival of newly independent African and Asian states in the U.N. General Assembly 
in the 1960's.  Their struggle against racism and overthrow of colonialism energized and 
reshaped the U.N. human rights agenda.  Thus the first U.N.-administered human rights treaty 
was the convention against race discrimination, adopted in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.   
 ¶ 113 Their stamp is also imprinted on the two Covenants.  The first article of each 
identically proclaims, "All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development."59  Moreover: "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources . . ."60 
 ¶ 114 Within only a few years, however, the disappointing domestic trajectories of most 
former colonies sapped their support for human rights.  As most new governments of Africa and 
Asia rapidly evolved into repressive regimes—usually supported by one Cold War superpower 
or the other—they resisted efforts to extend or implement the U.N. Covenants.   
 ¶ 115 The coalition of states supporting the U.N. human rights program has since shifted.  
Nowadays its core support consists mainly of democratic and democratizing states.  This may be 
obscured by the large numbers of states parties (one hundred-and-forty-five or more) to the most 
popular U.N. human rights treaties—the two Covenants and the treaties on women's and 
children's rights and against race discrimination.  But it can be seen in the smaller number of 
states (one-hundred-and-twenty-seven) parties to the torture convention; their military and police 
are more likely to be under effective civilian control or are, at least, less politically powerful.   
 ¶ 116 It can be seen as well in states which accept individual complaint procedures, such 
as the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant (one-hundred-and-one parties).  And 
in the forty-eight states (to date) which have ratified the treaty to create the ICC.  Most clearly, it 
can be seen in the common denominators of the above: the shorter list of mostly democratic 
states which are not only parties to the torture convention, but also accept individual complaint 
procedures and support the ICC.  The U.K. is on that list; the U.S., although a party to the torture 
convention (subject to reservations), is not. 
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59U.N. CHARTER art 1.1. 
60Id. at art. 1.2. 
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C. Communications Technology. 
 ¶ 117 As late as the early nineteenth century, global communication, when possible at all, 
was much slower.  News of distant events might not reach one's shores for months, after the 
arrival of sailing ships, if at all.  Human rights movements were mainly national or, at most, 
trans-Atlantic. 
 ¶ 118 By mid-twentieth century air travel, radio, telegraph and newsreels facilitated the 
development of global consciousness and global organizing on human rights.  Still, most NGO's 
at the U.N. founding conference in San Francisco were American.  Global travel and 
communications remained too slow, expensive and often inaccessible or unreliable. 
 ¶ 119 As late as the 1980's, global human rights organizing was technically daunting.  
Telephone service in the developing world was unreliable, foreign newspapers generally difficult 
to obtain.  To learn more than London or New York media reported about, say, El Salvador or 
Kenya, one often had to go there. 
 ¶ 120 Then came the electronic communications revolution.  By the end of the 1990's, 
most major human rights NGO's worldwide had email, internet access and web pages.  Groups 
far and wide now inform each other and strategize instantly and collectively.  Their reports are 
made immediately accessible to all.  Activists can read the web pages of daily newspapers in 
distant lands.  U.N. documents, previously available only in libraries in capital cities and only 
after months of delay and unreliably, are now promptly available to activists everywhere on the 
U.N. web page. 
 ¶ 121 In less than a decade the density of communications among NGO's globally reached 
levels previously achievable only nationally or sub-nationally.  The results can be seen in the 
unprecedented intensity and effectiveness of NGO involvement in such events as the 1995 
Beijing conference on women's rights, and in the late 1990's campaigns for treaties on anti-
personnel land mines and the ICC. 
 ¶ 122 The degree to which the communications revolution will enable the human rights 
revolution actually to protect people remains to be seen.  But rights advocacy is now more 
global, empowered by information, and capable of rapid and coordinated action than even a few 
years ago. 
D. Networks. 
 ¶ 123 The roles in the revolution of NGO's, supportive states and communications 
technology cannot be understood in isolation but must be viewed—as they are in fact used—in 
combination.  Academic observers note the rise of "epistemic communities"—communities 
defined not by geography, religion, ethnicity or other traditional indicia, but by their common 
knowledge of and interest in a global topic such as human rights.    
 ¶ 124 Others describe "transnational issue networks"—emphasizing that proponents of 
transnational goals cross institutional lines.  Thus the global network of human rights advocates 
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involves informal coordination between NGO activists and supportive officials within 
governments and inter-governmental organizations, sympathetic journalists and academics, and 
even like-minded governments.  Their priorities may be defined not so much by institutional 
affiliation as by a common commitment to human rights, often reinforced by personal or 
professional ties to others in the network.  Working together they are far more effective. 
E.  Momentum. 
 ¶ 125 Independent of any single component, the revolution's sheer momentum tends to 
carry it forward.  New treaties create new international enforcement bodies, which then seek out 
new NGO allies to make new program commitments, which then advocate for national 
compliance.  Any one step sets in motion a chain reaction.  And many steps are taken each year, 
catalyzing mutually reinforcing sequences of activity.  Once a critical mass of activity is 
reached—as in the field of human rights in the last half century—the revolution is partly self-
perpetuating. 
 ¶ 126 Momentum is sustained in part by a "ratcheting up" effect.  New human rights 
norms are continually developed, but few repealed; new institutions created, but few abolished.  
Over time more governments join human rights treaties, but few withdraw.  Even when a prior 
government ratified a treaty only for reasons of passing political expedience, a new government 
hesitates to call attention to itself by withdrawing.  The result is a progressive thickening of the 
normative and institutional density of international human rights regimes. 
F.  Globalization. 
 ¶ 127 Globalization has several positive effects on the human rights revolution.  Global 
communications technology accelerates the spread of human rights consciousness and facilitates 
coordinated advocacy.  Greater global financial and economic interdependence renders outlaw 
states more vulnerable to international economic pressure to improve their rights records. 
 ¶ 128 But globalization has an important countervailing effect.  An essential component of 
the international human rights revolution is the national government.  Treaties, by definition, are 
agreements among governments.  Human rights treaties either prohibit governments from 
committing violations (e.g., torture), bind them to take affirmative steps to protect rights (e.g., to 
establish judicial or social security systems), or utilize them to curb violations by others (e.g., 
domestic violence against women).  While treaties may also establish international mechanisms, 
these are designed to work through, and are generally subsidiary to, national governments. 
 ¶ 129 Globalization, however, tends to weaken national governments.  Competitive 
pressures in global markets, and policies imposed by international financial institutions, lead to 
privatization of public services and deregulation of private activity.  Entry into national markets 
is gained by huge multinational corporations whose revenues dwarf those of most governments.  
Taxes on these enterprises are limited by competitive pressures, while fiscal targets may force 
increases in consumption taxes on the poor, even as government expenditures on health and food 
subsidies are cut. 
 ¶ 130 There is ongoing debate over whether economic globalization and structural 
adjustment policies are good social and economic medicine in the long run.  The point here is not 
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to enter that larger debate, but simply to observe that an important instrument of human rights 
delivery—the national government—is no longer what it once was.  Its capacity as a delivery 
vehicle is diminished.61 
 ¶ 131 While this is clearest in the case of economic and social rights, diminished state 
capacity can also impede delivery of civil and political rights.  Governments that cannot afford 
properly to pay, train and recruit police, prosecutors and judges are at risk of violating rights to 
due process, and of using torture or mistreatment of suspects as substitutes for professional 
investigation.  Where government revenues are tight, prison budgets are taut; it should be no 
surprise that prison riots have erupted in Latin America in the last decade. 
 ¶ 132 If even well-meaning national governments cannot do the job, human rights regimes 
must look for alternative delivery vehicles. 
G. Non-State Actors 
 ¶ 133 Increasingly they have.  Recently the human rights revolution has focused on non-
state actors.  U.N. peacekeeping missions with human rights components substitute for failed 
states or intervene in conflicts.  Human rights rules are imposed on U.N. peacekeepers.  Not only 
traditional laws of war but also human rights norms are imposed on guerrilla forces as well. 
 ¶ 134 Multinational corporations attract mounting human rights attention.  This has led to 
a growing number and sophistication of voluntary corporate codes of conduct on worker rights, 
and sometimes on broader human rights issues, as well as more vigorous and sometimes even 
independent, external monitoring of corporate codes. 
 ¶ 135 International financial and economic agencies—such as the World Bank, IMF and 
the World Trade Organization—are also targets of human rights protest and reform efforts. 
 ¶ 136 Finally, societal mores and private conduct in such matters as domestic violence, 
female genital mutilation, bride burning, and sexual trafficking of women and children are now 
prominent on the human rights agenda.  States are not the primary culprits in such matters, but 
are asked to help curb them. 
 ¶ 137 However, this latest phase of the revolution—focusing on non-state actors—is less 
well developed in pub lic consciousness and international laws and institutions.  While the gap in 
human rights norms governing state and non-state actors is beginning to close, it will not soon 
disappear.  Powerful multinational corporations, for example, still see their human rights 
practices as, in effect, within their “exclusive domestic jurisdiction.”  A long struggle lies ahead. 
                                                 
61See generally Andrew G. McGrew, Human Rights in a Global Age: Coming to Terms with Globalization , in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIFTY YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL 188 (Tony Evans ed., 1998). 
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VI.      Conclusion 
 ¶ 138 A leading historian of human rights styles his principal work, “The Evolution of 
International Human Rights.”62  One cannot quarrel with his stress on the accumulation of 
developments throughout history that led to modern international human rights regimes.  Short-
sighted moderns must understand that international human rights were not invented full-blown in 
1945.   
 ¶ 139 At the same time, what has taken place in the last half century is qualitatively 
different—and far more intense and accelerated—than its precursors.  There has been a 
revolution in consciousness, law and institutions.  In both a formal and a real sense, basic human 
rights are no longer merely national, but global concerns.   
 ¶ 140 The rights revolution can claim partial credit for significant improvements in rights 
realities in many countries.  But in large portions of the globe, formal rights are not yet translated 
into reality.  Moreover, the focus of the rights revolution on states, both as violators and 
enforcement vehicles, is increasingly bypassed by economic globalization, civil wars, and 
evolving social attitudes toward gender roles in the family.  The international human rights 
revolution to date—an achievement of historic magnitude—remains far from complete. 
                                                 
62 LAUREN, supra  note 7 (emphasis added). 
